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Contingency Learning in Alcohol Dependence and
Pathological Gambling: Learning and Unlearning Reward
Contingencies
Lucy D. Vanes, Ruth J. van Holst, JochemM. Jansen, Wim van den Brink, Jaap Oosterlaan,
and Anna E. Goudriaan
Background: Patients with alcohol dependence (AD) and pathological gambling (PG) are character-
ized by dysfunctional reward processing and their ability to adapt to alterations of reward contingencies
is impaired. However, most neurocognitive tasks investigating reward processing involve a complex
mix of elements, such as working memory, immediate and delayed rewards, and risk-taking. As a conse-
quence, it is not clear whether contingency learning is altered in AD or PG. Therefore, the current study
aimed to examine performance in a deterministic contingency learning task, investigating discrimina-
tion, reversal, and extinction learning.
Methods: Thirty-three alcohol-dependent patients (ADs), 28 pathological gamblers (PGs), and 18
healthy controls (HCs) performed a contingency learning task in which they learned stimulus–reward
associations that were ﬁrst reversed and later extinguished while receiving deterministic feedback
throughout. Accumulated points, number of perseverative errors and trials required to reach a criterion
in each learning phase were compared between groups using nonparametric Kruskal–Wallis rank-sum
tests. Regression analyses were performed to compare learning curves.
Results: PGs and ADs did not diﬀer from HCs in discrimination learning, reversal learning, or
extinction learning, on the nonparametric tests. Regression analyses, however, showed diﬀerences in
the initial speed of learning: PGs were signiﬁcantly faster in discrimination learning compared to ADs,
and both PGs and ADs learned slower than HCs in the reversal learning and extinction phases of the
task.
Conclusions: Learning rates for reversal and extinction were slower for the alcohol-dependent group
and PG group compared to HCs, suggesting that reversing and extinguishing learned contingencies
require more eﬀort in ADs and PGs. This implicates a diminished ﬂexibility to overcome previously
learned contingencies.
Key Words: Reversal Learning, Extinction Learning, Alcohol Dependence, Pathological
Gambling, Orbitofrontal Cortex.
THE ABILITY TO appropriately process reward andpunishment is crucial for adaptive behavior in a con-
stantly changing environment. Intact contingency learning
abilities can be seen as the basis for reliable long-term deci-
sion-making processes in real life: stimulus–response–out-
come associations must be identiﬁed and learned
appropriately to know which behavior will result in the most
rewarding and least damaging outcome. At the same time,
these processes must be ﬂexible enough to adapt when
reward contingencies in the environment change.
Reward and punishment processing are compromised in
patients with substance use disorders (SUDs) compared to
healthy subjects (De Ruiter et al., 2009; for a review, see
Diekhof et al., 2008). Speciﬁcally, patients show a motiva-
tional bias toward the drug of abuse and related stimuli
(Goldstein and Volkow, 2002; Wrase et al., 2002), while at
the same time being less sensitive to drug-unrelated rewards
(Goldstein et al., 2007; Martin-Soelch et al., 2001). Patho-
logical gambling (PG) is classiﬁed as an addiction in the
DSM-5 and has also been associated with compromised
reward processing (Van Holst et al., 2010). Sensitivity to
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punishment in particular seems to be reduced in pathological
gamblers (PGs; De Ruiter et al., 2009; Reuter et al., 2005).
These impairments in patients with SUDs and PG also reﬂect
the dysfunctional reward processing of aﬀected individuals
in real life ultimately leading to continued substance use or
persistent gambling despite serious negative consequences in
terms of health and social functioning. This indicates a lack
of ﬂexibility to learn or unlearn new reward contingencies (to
be distinguished from a more general cognitive ﬂexibility to
change problem-solving strategies when needed, as measured
for example by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Heaton,
1981) which is essential for adaptive functioning.
Contingency learning has discrimination learning at its
basis. In discrimination learning, reward values of certain
stimuli are learned. After the discrimination learning phase,
cognitive ﬂexibility in response to changing contingencies
can be indexed by 2 abilities within contingency learning:
reversal learning and extinction learning (Itami and Uno,
2002). Discrimination learning, reversal learning, and extinc-
tion learning can be studied in simple visual decision-making
tasks, in which the reward values of certain stimuli are
learned. Respondents hereby learn when to react and when
to refrain from reacting to gain reward and avoid punish-
ment, respectively. When the contingency rules have been
suﬃciently acquired (discrimination learning), there are 2
main ways in which reward contingencies can be altered. The
ﬁrst is to change contingencies such that responses to previ-
ously rewarding stimuli are punished and responses to previ-
ously punishing stimuli are rewarded (reversal learning).
Alternatively, stimuli and responses can abruptly fail to deli-
ver reward altogether, forcing the respondent to refrain from
any type of reaction. This last aspect of contingency learning
is called extinction learning.
Response perseveration in people with SUD and PG has
generally been studied with probabilistic discrimination
learning tasks (De Ruiter et al., 2009), Go/No-Go tasks with
probabilistic cueing (Fillmore and Rush, 2006). or tasks
involving gambling elements (Bechara et al., 2001; Gou-
driaan et al., 2005; Leeman and Potenza, 2012). In all these
tasks, information on reward contingencies must be inte-
grated over a period of time to perform successfully. In prob-
abilistic discrimination learning, responses to stimuli are
followed by feedback which is correct most, but not all of the
time. One trial per stimulus is therefore not suﬃcient to learn
its reward value. Clearly, this process requires more complex
cognitive processing, including working memory, processing
of immediate and delayed rewards, and weighing risks and
beneﬁts. To study pure contingency learning, a simpler,
deterministic task is needed. Itami and Uno (2002) developed
a task in which responses are followed by accurate feedback
throughout, relieving working memory from integrating
probabilistic information during the task. This task is used in
the current study. Reversal and extinction learning deﬁcits
with a deterministic feedback setup have also been associated
with deﬁcient orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) functioning (Fel-
lows and Farah, 2003).
Importantly, disruptions in discrimination, reversal, or
extinction learning can elucidate the neural basis of the con-
ditions under study. The OFC in particular has been fre-
quently implicated in cognitive ﬂexibility in contingency
learning (De Ruiter et al., 2009; Rolls, 2004; Tsuchida et al.,
2010). A large number of human lesion studies have shown
that lesions to the OFC are associated with increased persev-
erative responding to previously rewarded stimuli following
extinction or reversal of reinforcement contingencies (Becha-
ra et al., 2001; Hornak et al., 2004; Rolls et al., 1994).
Interestingly, OFC dysfunctions have been implicated in
SUDs and PG (Cavedini et al., 2002; London et al., 2000;
Van Holst et al., 2012; Volkow and Fowler, 2000). Speciﬁ-
cally, drug exposure may cause alterations in neuronal activ-
ity in the OFC and lead to impaired performance on
orbitofrontal-dependent learning tasks (Schoenbaum and
Shaham, 2008). In line with this reasoning, response persev-
eration to previously rewarding stimuli in reversal and
extinction learning and similar tasks has been shown in
patients with cocaine dependence (Ersche et al., 2008, 2011),
patients with alcohol dependence (AD; Bechara et al., 2001;
Goudriaan et al., 2005), as well as people with a family his-
tory of alcoholism (Giancola et al., 1993) and prenatal expo-
sure to alcohol (Kodituwakku et al., 2001), and in people
with PG (De Ruiter et al., 2009; Goudriaan et al., 2005; for
a review, see Leeman and Potenza, 2012).
In conclusion, there is a lack of knowledge on contingency
learning in AD and PG, speciﬁcally with regard to determin-
istic feedback (Izquierdo and Jentsch, 2012). In the current
study, we therefore examine discrimination, reversal, and
extinction learning in alcohol-dependent patients (ADs) and
PGs in comparison with healthy controls (HCs) while reduc-
ing working memory load during the task by implementing a
visual discrimination learning task with deterministic feed-
back. We expected ADs and PGs to show impaired reversal
and extinction learning performance as compared to HCs
due to OFC dysfunction in these disorders as well as evidence
of maladaptive responding to reward and punishment and
inﬂexibility following contingency changes in some of our
previous studies (De Ruiter et al., 2009; Goudriaan et al.,
2005).
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
Participants
The study sample consisted of 28 treatment-seeking PGs, 34
treatment-seeking, abstinent ADs, and 19 HCs. Only male partici-
pants were included as treatment-seeking PGs are mainly male.
Participants were between the ages of 19 and 59 (M = 40.03;
SD = 10.71). PGs and ADs were recruited from Dutch addiction
treatment centers, and HCs were recruited through advertisements
in local newspapers. Procedures were approved by the ethical review
board of the Academic Medical Center, and written informed con-
sent was provided by all participants.
DSM-IV criteria for PGwere assessed with section T of the Diag-
nostic Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (Robins et al., 1995). In
addition, the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur and
Blume, 1987) was administered, the main inclusion criterion for PG
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being a score of 5 or higher. PG was an exclusion criterion for ADs
and HCs.
DSM-IV-TR criteria for alcohol abuse or dependence were
assessed with section J of the Dutch version of the Clinical Interna-
tional Interview Schedule (World Health Organization, 1997). In
addition, AD severity was assessed with the Alcohol Use Disorders
Identiﬁcation Test (AUDIT; Bush et al., 1998). ADs had been absti-
nent for a minimum of 2 weeks. AD or abuse was an exclusion crite-
rion for PGs and HCs.
Exclusion criteria for all groups were brain trauma, lifetime diag-
nosis of schizophrenia or psychotic episodes, 12-month diagnosis of
manic disorder, substance dependence or abuse other than AD in
the alcohol-dependent group, obsessive–compulsive disorder or
posttraumatic stress disorder, treatment in the last 12 months for
neurological disorders or mental disorders other than those under
study, and use of psychotropic medication. In addition, urine tests
for alcohol, amphetamines, benzodiazepines, opioids, or cocaine
had to be negative.
Intelligence (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Score—Revised [WAIS-
R]; Wechsler, 1981), depression severity (Beck Depression Inventory
[BDI]; Beck et al., 1996), impulsivity (Barratt Impulsivity Scale
[BIS-11]; Patton et al., 1995), and number of cigarettes smoked per
day were assessed as potential confounders.
Task Description
General Procedure. Stimuli consisted of 4 rectangles containing
diﬀerent colored patterns (approx. 20° visual angle horizontally,
12° visual angle vertically) which appeared 1 at a time on a com-
puter screen in a randomized order (Figure 1). Participants were
instructed that they were to react to some, but not to all patterns
by pressing the space bar and that the goal of the task was to ﬁnd
out which patterns required a reaction and which did not. They
were also informed that correct reactions (i.e., pressing the space
bar on the correct patterns and refraining from pressing the space
bar on the incorrect patterns) would yield 1 point, while con-
versely incorrect reactions would lead to subtraction of 1 point
from the running total. Participants were informed that 10 Euro-
cents would be paid for every gained point at the end of the task.
Further instructions stated that the rules could unexpectedly
change at any given moment. Trials began with the presentation
of a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms. Stimuli were presented for
2,000 ms or until a response with given. After every trial, written
feedback (“correct”/“incorrect”) and an indication of whether a
point had been won or lost were presented on the screen
(1,500 ms). Participants were instructed to use this feedback to
learn which stimuli did or did not require a response. All partici-
pants performed a practice block, consisting of a diﬀerent set of 3
stimuli, which were each presented repeatedly until a correct
response was given.
Discrimination Learning. The discrimination phase directly fol-
lowed the practice phase. Of the 4 stimuli, 2 required a response and
2 did not. The criterion for successfully completing the discrimina-
tion phase was giving 9 correct responses within 10 consecutive tri-
als. Hence, the number of trials presented was not equal for all
participants, but depended on their speed of learning. If the criterion
had not been reached within 120 trials, the discrimination phase was
automatically ended (this, however, did not occur, as all participants
reached criterion in <120 trials). Example trials are shown in
Fig. 1A.
Reversal Learning. After reaching criterion in the discrimination
phase, reward contingencies were reversed without warning.
Responding to the previously correct stimuli was penalized, whereas
responding to the previously incorrect stimuli was rewarded with 1
point. Testing was discontinued upon reaching the criterion of 9
correct trials of 10 consecutive trials. For 5 participants, reversal
learning was ended automatically as they did not succeed in reach-
ing criterion within 120 trials. Example trials are shown in Fig. 1B.
Extinction Learning. Following a 10-minute break, during
which questionnaires were administered, participants were subjected
to a second discrimination phase. Reward contingencies were identi-
cal to those previously learned in the reversal phase, so this phase
did not require respondents to learn unfamiliar contingencies. When
a criterion of 9 correct responses in 10 consecutive trials had been
reached, the extinction phase began. No stimulus required a
response, so pressing the space bar to any stimulus was penalized
with the loss of 1 point. The task was ended after 15 consecutive cor-
rect extinction trials. All participants reached criterion within 120
trials. Example trials are shown in Fig. 1C.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses of behavioral data were performed for the
ﬁrst discrimination phase (Fig. 1A), the reversal phase (Fig. 1B),
and the extinction phase (Fig. 1C). Thus, the second discrimination
phase, which takes place preceding the extinction phase, was not
analyzed, as this phase has the same discrimination rules as during
the phase directly preceding it (i.e., the reversal phase). Data were
analyzed using R software for statistical computing (R Core Team,
2012). There were no missing data.
Main variables of interest were number of errors and number
of trials until the criterion was reached per phase (Itami and Uno,
2002). Errors were deﬁned as commission errors (reactions to pun-
ishing stimuli), which are equivalent to perseveration errors in
reversal and extinction. Due to skewed data, nonparametric Krus-
kal–Wallis rank-sum tests were performed on these variables as
well as on sample characteristics. Log-transformation or centraliz-
ing did not succeed in normalizing most data for parametric
analyses.
Eﬀect sizes for nonsigniﬁcant results of these analyses were
consistently very small (g2 < 0.05) and are therefore not reported.
Linear regressions were performed to compare the learning pro-
cesses (i.e., mean score as a function of trial number) between the
groups. Due to the adaptive nature of the task, there was a large
variability in the amount of trials required until criterion was
reached. Over half of the participants completed each phase within
40 trials, with increasingly less participants accounting for the shape
of the learning curve up to the maximum possible trial (120). This
leads to unsystematic distortions caused by a small sample size at
high trial numbers (e.g., N = 5 in trials 100 to 120 of the reversal
phase) and increasingly drastic changes in the curve due to single
participants reaching criterion and dropping out. Hence, only the
ﬁrst sections of each phase were included into analyses. Cutoﬀ
points were set to the trial number per phase at which a maximum
of 60% of all participants had completed the task. This cutoﬀ was
chosen to ensure that at no stage in the analysis should less than 30
participants account for the data and that adjusted R2 of each
analysis should not fall below 0.80. A high R2 value is a reasonable
requirement as we assumed trial number and group to be the princi-
pal predictors of mean score. This resulted in a cutoﬀ at trial 24
(inclusive) for the discrimination phase, trial 29 for the reversal
phase, and trial 35 for the extinction phase. The results of these
analyses therefore reﬂect the ﬁrst phases of discrimination, reversal,
and extinction learning.
For each phase, a stepwise forward model selection procedure
was implemented. With this method, the continuous predictor trial
number and categorical predictor group are successively added to a
linear model, the saturated model consisting of both additive and
interactive eﬀects of both predictors. Successive models are com-
pared with likelihood ratio tests, and the model providing the best
ﬁt to the data is retained as the most suitable model.
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Fig. 1. Example trials in discrimination (A), reversal (B), and extinction (C) phase.
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RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Per group, participants who made errors exceeding 2 stan-
dard deviations from the mean were excluded from further
analyses. This resulted in the exclusion of 1 HC and 1 alco-
hol-dependent patient, leaving 18 HCs, 28 PGs, and 33 ADs
for analyses.
Sample characteristics are presented in Table 1. Groups
diﬀered signiﬁcantly in age (ADs being older than both HCs
and PGs) and depression severity as measured by the BDI
(PGs being the most depressed and HCs the least depressed).
Neither age nor BDI scores correlated signiﬁcantly with task
performance (Spearman’s q = 0.22 to 0.40, all ps > 0.05)
and were therefore not entered into further analyses as
potential confounding factors. Groups also diﬀered on the
mean number of cigarettes smoked per day (with HCs smok-
ing less than both ADs and PGs). However, smoking behav-
ior was not signiﬁcantly correlated with task performance
within any group (Spearman’s q = 0.32 to 0.38, all
ps > 0.05), and therefore, smoking was not included as a
potential confounder in further analyses. As expected,
groups diﬀered signiﬁcantly in the extent of gambling- and
drinking-related problems, as measured by SOGS and
AUDIT, respectively. Number of years since problem drink-
ing or problem gambling began did not diﬀer between ADs
(M = 10.1, SD = 8.8) and PGs (M = 8.93, SD = 8.99) and
did not relate to task performance (Spearman’s q = 0.05 to
0.31, all ps > 0.05). It was therefore not included in further
analyses.
Discrimination Learning
The average running score increased with the number of
trials (as seen in a signiﬁcant positive linear eﬀect of trial
number on score in all groups in all phases, all ps < 0.001),
indicating that overall learning took place.
The number of commission errors until criterion was
reached did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between groups,
v2(2) = 2.27, p = 0.32. The number of trials needed until
reaching criterion did not diﬀer between groups,
v2(2) = 2.65, p = 0.27. Means and standard deviations can
be found in Tables 2 and 3.
A regression analysis was performed on the ﬁrst 24 trials
of the discrimination phase to determine learning progres-
sion in the 3 groups. Figure 2 shows the learning curves in
HCs, PGs, and ADs. A stepwise forward model selection
procedure entering ﬁrst trial number and then group as pre-
dictors of mean score revealed that a model with an interac-
tive trial by group term provided a signiﬁcantly better ﬁt to
the data than a model with trial number alone, p = 0.03,
indicating a diﬀerence in slopes between the groups (adjusted
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, Test Statistics, and Statistical Significance of Sample Characteristics as a Function of Group
Sample characteristics
HCs PGs ADs Test statistics
M SD M SD M SD v2=F-value df p-Value
N 18 28 33
Age (years) 39.1 10.5 36.6 12.0 43.8 8.5 6.24 2 0.04
Cigarettes/d 3.94 6.86 10.41 10.96 14.73 14.45 10.12 2 <0.001
WAIS-R score 14.7 4.3 13.1 3.4 12.8 3.9 2.51 2 0.28
BDI 5.1 6.4 13.5 8.5 8.4 6.7 10.54 2 0.005
BIS-11 69.7 2.6 70.9 3.5 71.1 5.7 1.09 2 0.58
SOGS 0.11 0.32 10.61 3.15 0.15 0.36 64.87 2 <0.001
AUDIT 5.5 3.6 5.6 5.2 27.1 7.1 46.70 2 <0.001
HCs, healthy controls; PGs, pathological gamblers; ADs, alcohol-dependent patients; v2, Kruskal–Wallis test statistic; WAIS-R, Wechsler Adult Intelli-
gence Score; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; BIS-11, Barratt Impulsivity Scale; SOGS, South Oaks Gambling Screen; AUDIT, Alcohol Use Disorders
Identification Test.
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, Test Statistics, and Statistical
Significance of Commission Errors/Perseveration Errors Made in Each
Phase Per Group
Phase
HCs
N = 18
PGs
N = 28
ADs
N = 33 Test statistics
M SD M SD M SD v2 df p-Value
Discrimination
learning
4.7 5.4 5.3 6.3 4.5 3.0 2.27 2 0.32
Reversal 6.2 6.8 10.3 11.8 7.9 8.8 0.61 2 0.74
Extinction 5.6 3.0 6.1 4.4 6.4 3.6 0.95 2 0.62
HCs, healthy controls; PGs, pathological gamblers; ADs, alcohol-depen-
dent patients; v2, Kruskal–Wallis test statistic.
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, Test Statistics, and Statistical
Significance of Trials Until Criterion in Each Phase Per Group
Phase
HCs
N = 18
PGs
N = 28
ADs
N = 33 Test statistics
M SD M SD M SD v2 df
p-
Value
Discrimination 1 25.6 23.3 26.1 21.0 25.6 11.7 2.65 2 0.27
Reversal 28.2 20.7 42.2 37.4 36.1 29.9 1.02 2 0.60
Extinction 31.8 8.2 31.3 11.1 32.9 9.8 0.81 2 0.67
HCs, healthy controls; PGs, pathological gamblers; ADs, alcohol-depen-
dent patients; v2, Kruskal–Wallis test statistic.
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R2 = 0.80). On closer inspection, this was due to a steeper
slope (i.e., faster learning) in PGs than in ADs, p < 0.01. No
other diﬀerences were signiﬁcant.
Reversal Learning
HCs, PGs, and ADs made no signiﬁcantly diﬀerent num-
ber of perseverative errors until reaching criterion,
v2(2) = 0.61, p = 0.74, nor did they require a diﬀerent num-
ber of trials to reach criterion, v2(2) = 1.02, p = 0.60. Means
and standard deviations can be found in Tables 2 and 3.
Initial reversal learning was further analyzed in the ﬁrst 29
trials administered in this condition. Figure 3 shows the
learning curves for HCs, PGs, and ADs. Linear regression
analyses on mean score revealed that the best ﬁt of the data
was provided by a model including an interactive term for
number of trials and group (adjusted R2 = 0.86). This was
due to faster learning in HCs than in both PGs and ADs, all
ps < 0.05. Similar learning in PGs and ADs was reﬂected in
the lack of signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the group 9 trial
interaction terms for PGs and ADs, p = 0.49.
Extinction Learning
Participants of all 3 groups made a similar number of
perseverative errors until reaching criterion in extinction,
v2(2) = 0.95, p = 0.62, and did not diﬀer in the number of tri-
als until reaching criterion, v2(2) = 0.81, p = 0.67. Means
and standard deviations can be found in Tables 2 and 3.
Regression analyses were performed on the ﬁrst 35 trials
administered in this condition. Figure 4 shows the learning
curves in the extinction phase for HCs, PGs, and ADs. A
stepwise procedure for linear regression model selection
revealed that a model including an interactive term for trial
number and group provided the best ﬁt to the data (adjusted
R2 = 0.97). This was based on a signiﬁcant interaction for
trial number and group. A signiﬁcantly faster learning was
present in HCs compared to both PGs and ADs, and a
steeper slope in ADs compared to PGs, all ps < 0.01.
Correlations
Nonparametric Spearman’s correlations were computed
between BIS-11 questionnaire data and number of trials until
reaching criterion and number of errors in reversal and
extinction (trev, erev, text, and eext, respectively) for groups sep-
arately. In PGs, impulsivity (as measured by BIS-11) was
moderately positively correlated with number of persevera-
tive errors in extinction, Spearman’s q = 0.39, p < 0.01. In
ADs or HCs, there were no signiﬁcant correlations. No sig-
niﬁcant correlations were present between the dependent
variables and AUDIT scores in the alcohol-dependent group
or between the dependent variables and SOGS scores in the
PG group, indicating that addiction severity was not related
to contingency learning performance.
DISCUSSION
The goal of this study was to determine whether aspects of
contingency learning, including discrimination, reversal, and
extinction learning are impaired in ADs and PGs. We used a
deterministic discrimination learning task in which previously
learned reward contingencies were altered without warning.
We expected ADs and PGs to show impaired reversal and
extinction learning performance as compared to HCs based
on previous evidence of maladaptive reward processing and
inﬂexibility following changes of reinforcement contingencies
in AD and PG (De Ruiter et al., 2009; Goudriaan et al.,
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Fig. 2. Learning curves in the first 24 trials of discrimination.
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Fig. 3. Learning curves in the first 29 trials of reversal.
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2005), as well as the presence of OFC dysfunctions in
patients with these disorders (van Holst et al., 2012; Volkow
and Fowler, 2000). The current deterministic discrimination
learning task was meant to reduce working memory load
during the task to investigate contingency learning capacity,
without the interference of working memory load. Thus,
results from this study give insight in the contingency learn-
ing aspects of discrimination learning, reversal learning, and
extinction learning in ADs and PGs compared to HCs.
Contrary to our expectations, ADs and PGs did not signif-
icantly diﬀer from HCs with regard to total accumulated
points, number of perseverative errors, or trials until crite-
rion performance in either reversal or extinction phases.
However, the learning curves in the reversal and extinction
phases were steeper in HCs than in ADs and PGs, indicating
a more eﬃcient learning process in HCs.
There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of
signiﬁcant group diﬀerences in the reversal and extinction
phase regarding total accumulated points, errors, and num-
ber of trials in our study. First, it is interesting to note that
the descriptive data showed a tendency for group mean
diﬀerences in the reversal task, particularly with regard to
trials needed to reach criterion performance (PGs > ADs >
HCs). The large variability within groups is a possible
explanation for the lack of group diﬀerences in the total
accumulated points, errors, and number of trials. Interest-
ingly, this tendency was not observed in the extinction
phase. Second, the task setup in our study was relatively
simple in comparison with a number of previous studies.
We chose a deterministic setup based on an attention-deﬁ-
cit hyperactivity disorder study of Itami and Uno (2002).
Our choice was also based on pilot data, suggesting that
alcohol-dependent participants could not successfully learn
when a probabilistic design was used, and on an earlier
study in PG showing that with probabilistic feedback, PGs
were unable to successfully reverse their response strategy
(De Ruiter et al., 2009). Probabilistic feedback setups
require contradictory information (i.e., receiving both
reward and punishment for the same behavior) to be main-
tained in working memory and integrated over a number
of trials to result in a probabilistic judgment. They also
encourage perseverative responding after contingency rever-
sal (Cools et al., 2002) by rewarding incorrect responses in
a minority of trials. In the task setup chosen in our study,
working memory load was substantially lowered by the
choice of stimuli, which consisted of only 4 easily distin-
guishable patterns (by comparison, Goudriaan et al. [2005]
used 8 diﬀerent 2-digit numbers). Working memory deﬁcits
have been implicated in alcohol and substance use disor-
ders (Ambrose et al., 2001; Bechara and Martin, 2004) as
well as in PG (Leiserson and Pihl, 2007) and may bear
upon response perseveration previously observed in these
groups. It is possible that when working memory is mini-
mally challenged, both ADs and PGs are not signiﬁcantly
impaired in reversal and extinction learning.
As to the early learning advantage of HCs in reversal
and extinction compared to ADs and PGs found in the
regression analyses, these are in line with our prior expecta-
tions of group diﬀerences. In contrast to the parametric
tests, which assess overall performance on the task, the
regressions provide information on how fast participants
adapt to task demands in each phase. It is therefore possi-
ble that learning rates initially diﬀer between groups, before
eventually leveling out so that task performance ultimately
does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between groups. Unfortunately,
the adaptive nature of the task did not allow us to perform
reliable regressions on the entire data set. Nevertheless, the
analyses performed on the early learning phases within the
reversal and extinction parts of the task reveal noteworthy
results. Whereas all groups learned at the same pace during
initial discrimination, HCs were faster at adapting to new
reward contingencies (reversal learning). This result con-
verges with previous ﬁndings that HCs perform better after
contingency changes, but not during initial discrimination
learning, compared to subjects with SUDs (Ersche et al.,
2008) and to subjects with damage to the OFC (Rolls et al.,
1994). However, in the current study, the faster learning in
HCs compared to ADs and PGs was too subtle to be
reﬂected in signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the number of errors or
the number of trials needed to reach criterion performance.
It is therefore a possibility that diﬀerences between HCs
and patients indeed exist in reversal and extinction learning,
but that these diﬀerences are strongly dependent on task
diﬃculty and additional working memory demands. Pro-
cessing of probabilistic information may pose a particular
problem for ADs and PGs, accounting for the diﬃculty to
adapt behavior in everyday life (where reward contingencies
are not always as consistent and clear-cut as in our experi-
ment). Yet, when there is no uncertainty that reward con-
tingencies have been altered—as in deterministic feedback
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Fig. 4. Learning curves in the first 35 trials of extinction.
1608 VANES ET AL.
setups—ADs and PGs have less diﬃculty in learning the
new set of rules. Note, however, the correlation in PGs
between impulsivity and number of perseverative errors in
extinction: particularly impulsive gamblers seem less able to
refrain from any reaction, even when it becomes apparent
that each response is punished. Elevated impulsivity has
commonly been implicated in PG (Castellani and Rugle,
1995; Moran, 1970) and could be a further driving force
behind various decision-making deﬁcits.
In summary, we conclude that reversal and extinction
learning are not severely aﬄicted in AD and PG when learn-
ing conditions are straightforward, but that learning rates
are somewhat slower, indicating that unlearning reinforce-
ment contingencies takes more eﬀort in ADs and PGs com-
pared to HCs. We propose that task diﬃculty—particularly
the complexity of the feedback setup—contributes substan-
tially to diﬀerences between healthy individuals on the one
hand and PGs and ADs on the other. Systematically manip-
ulating task diﬃculty, for example, the degree of probabilis-
tic feedback information provided, would help determine
more speciﬁcally where diﬃculties lie in PG and AD. Addi-
tionally, physiological measures could serve to detect diﬀer-
ences in processes that are too subtle to manifest themselves
on a behavioral level. Future research should also reﬂect on
the fact that variability within clinical groups can be substan-
tial; it is therefore plausible that factors inherent to particular
subgroups of clinical samples (i.e., enhanced impulsivity)
take diﬀerent eﬀects on reversal and extinction performance.
Finally, given this heterogeneity in clinical samples, it is
important also to consider factors which can inﬂuence cogni-
tive functioning over time, such as clinical treatment. A limi-
tation of the current study is that treatment duration was not
assessed; research in this ﬁeld would be well advised to con-
trol for this variable in future.
Sudden alterations of established reward contingencies
in the environment are a disturbance to any system. Our
resourcefulness is demonstrated by the eﬃciency to adapt
quickly to these alterations. Seemingly, even in severe psy-
chological disorders such as AD and PG, this ability is
not overly impaired when the learning conditions are
plain and reliable. It is, however, the confrontation with
contradictory guidelines—rare rewards for dysfunctional
behavior—that leads to perseveration or relapse. A limita-
tion of the current study is that the relatively simple setup
with 4 diﬀerent stimuli may have lead to a lower power
to detect diﬀerences in the overall number of errors and
number of trials to attain the criteria. Future research
should focus on where the exact threshold in task com-
plexity lies that discriminates healthy from compromised
reward processing.
REFERENCES
Ambrose ML, Bowden SC, Whelan G (2001) Working memory impairments
in alcohol-dependent participants without clinical amnesia. Alcohol Clin
Exp Res 25:185–191.
Bechara A, Dolan S, Denburg N, Hindes A, Anderson SW, Nathan PE
(2001) Decision-making deﬁcits, linked to a dysfunctional ventromedial
prefrontal cortex, revealed in alcohol and stimulant abusers. Neuropsych-
ologia 39:276–289.
Bechara A, Martin EM (2004) Impaired decision making related to working
memory deﬁcits in individuals with substance addictions. Neuropsycholo-
gy 18:152–162.
Beck AT, Steer RA, Ball R, Ranieri WF (1996) Comparison of Beck Depres-
sion Inventories -IA and -II in psychiatric outpatients. J Pers Assess
67:588–597.
Bush K, Kivlahan DR, McDonell MB, Fihn SD, Bradley KA (1998) The
AUDIT alcohol consumption questions (AUDIT-C): an eﬀective brief
screening test for problem drinking. Arch InternMed 158:1789–1795.
Castellani B, Rugle L (1995) A comparison of pathological gamblers to alco-
holics and cocaine misusers on impulsivity, sensation seeking, and craving.
Int J Addict 30:275–289.
Cavedini P, Riboldi G, Keller R, D’Annucci A, Bellodi L (2002) Frontal lobe
dysfunction in pathological gambling patients. Biol Psychiatry 51:334–
341.
Cools R, Clark L, Owen AM, Robbins TW (2002) Deﬁning the neural mech-
anisms of probabilistic reversal learning using event-related functional
magnetic resonance imagine. J Neurosci 22:4563–4567.
De Ruiter MB, Veltman DJ, Goudriaan AE, Oosterlaan J, Sjoerds Z, van
den Brink W (2009) Response perseveration and ventral prefrontal sensi-
tivity to reward and punishment in male problem gamblers and smokers.
Neuropsychopharmacology 34:1027–1038.
Diekhof EK, Falkai P, Gruber O (2008) Functional neuroimaging of reward
processing and decision-making: a review of aberrant motivational and
aﬀective processing in addiction and mood disorders. Brain Res Rev
59:164–184.
Ersche KD, Roiser JP, Abbott S, Craig KJ, M€uller U, Suckling J, Ooi C,
Shabbir SS, Clark L, Sahakian BJ, Fineberg NA,Merlo-Pich EV, Robbins
TW, Bullmore ET (2011) Response perseveration in stimulant dependence
is associated with striatal dysfunction and can be ameliorated by a D2/3
receptor agonist. Biol Psychiatry 70:754–762.
Ersche KD, Roiser JP, Robbins TW, Sahakian BJ (2008) Chronic cocaine
but not chronic amphetamine use is associated with perseverative respond-
ing in humans. Psychopharmacology 197:421–431.
Fellows LK, FarahMJ (2003) Ventromedial frontal cortex mediates aﬀective
shifting in humans: evidence from a reversal learning paradigm. Brain
126:1830–1837.
Fillmore MT, Rush CR (2006) Polydrug abusers display impaired discrimi-
nation-reversal learning in a model of behavioural control. J Psychophar-
macol 20:24–31.
Giancola PR, Peterson JB, Pihl RO (1993) Risk for alcoholism, antisocial
behaviour, and response perseveration. J Clin Psychol 49:423–428.
Goldstein RZ, Alia-Klein N, Tomasi D, Zhang L, Cottone L, Maloney T,
Telang F, Caparelli E, Chang L, Ernst T, Samaras D, Squires NK, Vol-
kow N (2007) Decreased prefrontal cortical sensitivity to monetary reward
is associated with impaired motivation and self-control in cocaine addic-
tion. Am J Psychiatry 164:43–51.
Goldstein RZ, Volkow ND (2002) Drug addiction and its underlying neuro-
biological basis: neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the frontal
cortex. Am J Psychiatry 159:1642–1652.
Goudriaan AE, Oosterlaan J, de Beurs E, van den Brink W (2005) Decision
making in pathological gambling: a comparison between pathological
gamblers, alcohol dependents, persons with Tourette syndrome, and nor-
mal controls. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 23:137–151.
Heaton RK (1981) Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Manual. Psychological
Assessment Resources, Odessa.
Hornak J, O’Doherty J, Bramham J, Rolls ET, Morris RG, Bullock PR, Pol-
key CE (2004) Reward-related reversal learning after surgical excisions in
orbito-frontal or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in humans. J Cogn Neuro-
sci 16:463–478.
Itami S, Uno H (2002) Orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in attention-deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder revealed by reversal and extinction tasks. Neurore-
port 13:2453–2457.
CONTINGENCY LEARNING IN AD AND PG 1609
Izquierdo A, Jentsch JD (2012) Reversal learning as a measure of impulsive
and compulsive behaviour in addiction. Psychopharmacology 219:607–
620.
Kodituwakku PW, May PA, Clericuzio CL, Weers D (2001) Emotion-
related learning in individuals prenatally exposed to alcohol: an investiga-
tion of the relation between set shifting, extinction of responses, and
behaviour. Neuropsychologia 39:699–708.
Leeman RF, Potenza MN (2012) Similarities and diﬀerences between patho-
logical gambling and substance use disorders: a focus on impulsivity and
compulsivity. Psychopharmacology 219:469–490.
Leiserson V, Pihl RO (2007) Reward-sensitivity, inhibition of reward-seek-
ing, and dorsolateral prefrontal working memory function in problem
gamblers not in treatment. J Gambl Stud 23:435–455.
Lesieur HR, Blume SB (1987) The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS): a
new instrument for the identiﬁcation of pathological gamblers. Am J Psy-
chiatry 144:1184–1188.
London ED, ErnstM, Grant S, BonsonK,Weinstein A (2000) Orbitofrontal
cortex and human drug abuse: functional imaging. Cereb Cortex 10:334–
342.
Martin-Soelch C, Chevalley AF, K€unig G, Missimer J, Magyar S, Mino A,
Schutz W, Leenders KL (2001) Changes is reward-induced brain activa-
tion in opiate addicts. Eur J Neurosci 14:1360–1368.
Moran E (1970) Varieties of pathological gambling. Br J Psychiatry 116:593–
597.
Patton JH, Stanford MS, Barratt ES (1995) Factor structure of the Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale. J Clin Psychol 51:768–774.
R Core Team (2012) R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Com-
puting. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.
Reuter J, Raedler T, Rose M, Hand I, Gl€ascher J, B€uchel C (2005) Patholog-
ical gambling is linked to reduced activation of the mesolimbic reward sys-
tem. Nat Neurosci 8:147–148.
Robins LN, Cottler L, Bucholz K, Compton W (1995) The Diagnostic Inter-
view Schedule, Version IV. Washington University, St. Louis, MO.
Rolls ET (2004) The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex. Brain Cogn
55:11–29.
Rolls ET, Hornak J, Wade D, McGrath J (1994) Emotion-related learning in
patients with social and emotional changes associated with frontal lobe
damage. J Neurol Neurosurg Psychiatry 57:1518–1524.
Schoenbaum G, Shaham Y (2008) The role of orbitofrontal cortex in drug
addiction: a review of preclinical studies. Biol Psychiatry 63:256–262.
Tsuchida A, Doll BB, Fellows LK (2010) Beyond reversal: a critical role for
human orbitofrontal cortex in ﬂexible learning from probabilistic feed-
back. J Neurosci 30:16868–16875.
Van Holst RJ, van den Brink W, Veltman DJ, Goudriaan AE (2010) Brain
imaging studies in pathological gambling. Curr Psychiatry Rep 12:418–425.
Van Holst RJ, Veltman DJ, B€uchel C, van den Brink W, Goudriaan AE
(2012) Distorted expectancy coding in problem gambling: is the addictive
in the anticipation? Biol Psychiatry 71:741–748.
Volkow ND, Fowler JS (2000) Addiction, a disease of compulsion and drive:
involvement of the orbitofrontal cortex. Cereb Cortex 10:318–325.
Wechsler D (1981)WAIS-RManual. The Psychological Corp, San Antonio.
World Health Organization (1997) Composite International Diagnostic
Interview—Version 2.1. World Health Organization, Geneva.
Wrase J, Gr€usser SM, Klein S, Diener C, Hermann D, Flor H, Mann K,
Braus DF, Heinz A (2002) Development of alcohol-associated cues and
cue-induced brain activation in alcoholics. Eur Psychiatry 17:287–291.
1610 VANES ET AL.
